Description

A reflected cross-site scripting vulnerability exists in the message moving interface of miniBB (bb_func_movepost.php), available to administrators and moderators. When more than one message is selected for mass moving, the raw values of the deleteAll POST array are embedded into a hidden form field at line 271 (implode(',', $_POST['deleteAll']) inside value="...") without HTML encoding, and echoed back at line 356.

Proof of Concept:

curl -b "MODERATOR_COOKIES" -H "Referer: http://HOSTNAME/" \
  --data 'action=movepost&deleteAll[]="><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>&deleteAll[]=2' \
  http://HOSTNAME/index.php

The injected onerror handler executes when the confirmation form is rendered.

Impact

An attacker able to make a moderator submit a crafted selection can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the moderator's session. The request must also pass the forum's built-in referer check, which makes exploitation harder.

CVSS 3.1 base score: 4.7 Medium (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N).

Solution

Fixed in miniBB 3.8. Upgrade to 3.8 or later. To patch an older install by hand, apply operate_string() (or integer validation) to the array values before embedding them in the hidden field.

Timeline

  • 2026-09-25: Reported to the miniBB maintainer, together with the other miniBB 3.7.2 issues.
  • 2026-10-01: The maintainer sent a pre-release with the fix (deleteAll values are now cast to integers). Fix verified.
  • 2026-11-20: Fixed in miniBB 3.8. Report published.

References